استكشف المجموعة الواسعة من العناوين المتاحة.

In numerical modelling of soil response it is often required to define an accurate value for the stiffness at small strains (G 0 ). Such values are usually obtained from tables or charts available in the literature, rather than being directly measured in tests. These will however be sufficiently accurate only if a similar soil has already been studied and described. In the present paper, the results of a series of laboratory tests conducted on a soil from southern Italy are reported. In these tests, a well-established empirical relationship linking small-strain stiffness values to state parameters was calibrated, allowing the determination of accurate G 0 values for the specific soil, and contributing to the collection of data in the literature. The bender element technique, in conjunction with standard triaxial testing on reconstituted soil samples, was employed. A series of isotropic compression tests was used for the calibration, and the resulting power law was then checked through shear testing. The proposed equation compares well with results reported in the literature for different types of soils. On approaching failure a change in behaviour is evident; this is in accordance with observations already reported in the literature for a variety of soils and is subject to several interpretations, but does not substantially interfere with the general validity of the proposed correlation, which can therefore be adopted as a useful empirical equation for determining G 0 values for this soil.

Cyberterrorism and cybercrime are on the rise. One new webpage was infected every 4.5 seconds by malicious email attachments in 2008, five times more than the previous year. The normal computer user also has to fight against new 'scareware' or fake antivirus software websites (five new ones identified every day) and the ubiquitous spam. It seems clear that the more technology advances, the greater the increase in the number of threats. According to expert reports there were more than 237 million attacks to information security all over the world in the first half of 2005 only. States cannot control cyber crime at the individual level and international cooperation is highly needed. Securing cyberspace is, however, extremely difficult, as it requires facing strategic challenges and cooperation between the public, private, military and civilian sectors of our society. It is therefore necessary to fully understand the characteristics, principles and challenges that underlie the development of secure information systems. This book is one of the first comprehensive attempts to address all the issues mentioned above and highlights the urgent need of a multidisciplinary approach to cope with cyber threats. It presents all the factors that need to be taken into consideration, rethinks current strategies and identifies urgent measures to be taken in order to minimize the strategic and economic impact of cyber attacks. This volume is divided into three parts: the first one revises various conceptual approaches to security, explaining concepts such as cryptography and how it is applied. The second part focuses on terrorists attacks and attacks to critical infrastructures and the third part reviews European measures and legal issues. The final chapter also includes experts' recommendations and proposals for a more secure cyberspace in the future. Modelling Cyber Security: Approaches, Methodology, Strategies could be of great interest to engineers working on IT security and everybody -from government departments to small companies and regular Internet users- concerned with the overall impact of security in the Net.

Technology has altered and corroded the State's authority and strenghtened non-state actors, in particular transnational crime and terrorist organizations. Cybercriminals and terrorists have already \"crossed into the spectrum of information warfare\". As a consequence, states cannot control cybercrime at the individual state level. Internet offers an ideal opportunity to cybercriminals to make money, organize attacks, and remain anonymous. It is a must to elaborate measures, national and international, against high-tech behaviour. Our juridical systems need to be revised, as our traditional laws are devised to protect physical property and physical 'goods', and not the virtual assets of the world of computers. Internet allowed Islamic terrorism to become a global phenomenon, creating a virtual community corresponding to the Umma of Salafism. Cybercrime is likely to be a major threat in the years ahead.

Technology has altered & corroded the State's authority & strengthened non-state actors, in particular transnational crime & terrorist organizations. Cybercriminals & terrorists have already \"crossed into the spectrum of information warfare.\" As a consequence, states cannot control cybercrime at the individual state level. Internet offers an ideal opportunity to cybercriminals to make money, organize attacks, & remain anonymous. It is a must to elaborate measures, national & international, against high-tech behavior. Our juridical systems need to be revised, as our traditional laws are devised to protect physical property & physical 'goods', & not the virtual assets of the world of computers. Internet allowed Islamic terrorism to become a global phenomenon, creating a virtual community corresponding to the Umma of Salafism. Cy-bercrime is likely to be a major threat in the years ahead. Adapted from the source document.

Technology and the information revolution have changed the balance of power, both domestically and internationally, and are altering the dynamics of international relations. Technology has altered and corroded the State's authority and strengthened nonstate actors, in particular transnational crime and terrorist organizations. The technological revolution, though positive in itself, is nonetheless successful in corrupting markets and weakening security. As has been said, cybercriminals and terrorists have already \"crossed into the spectrum of information warfare\". This simply means that the same bases of sovereignty and state legitimacy are in jeopardy. The traditional paradigms of international relations are challenged. Postinternational global theories, such as the turbulence paradigm, are now trying to read with new lenses the new state of the world.This publication, enriched by the contribution of so many experts coming from different countries and cultures will contribute to the solution of at least some of the problems and 'invisible threats' - corruption, trafficking in documents, high-tech crime and money laundering - that are challenging our societies and our security.

Questioni aperte dopo il trattato INF. - Caratteristiche \"rivoluzionarie\" del Trattato. - La Nato risponde alla sfida: equivoci di fondo. - Alla ricerca di un \"nuovo concetto strategico\". - L'indebita equazione stabilità-simmetria e la falsità del pregiudizio negoziale. - Il recupero delle Nazioni Unite: le parole e i fatti di Gorbaciov. - Sicurezza e difesa alternativa: logica intergovernative e logica federale. - Atto Unico Europeo: tecnologia e industria per la difesa. - Un interrogativo-sfida

Ideologie e fatti in politica estera. - Politica estera e politica interna. - Un \"tertium genus\"? - Partiti politici e politica estera